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I.   Providing Due Process Rights to Military Personnel Facing Administrative 
Action for Rules of Engagement Violations   
 
      The purpose of this paper is to propose the creation of an autonomous 
administrative oversight board – ROE Review Board – for military personnel who 
face adverse administrative punishment for alleged violations of combat rules of 
engagement (ROE). 
 
 
II.  Law of War vs. Rules of Engagement 
 
     All military personnel are required to abide by the law of armed conflict, also 
known as the law of war, as codified in Army Field Manual 27-10.1  The central 
international treaty dealing with the law of war is the 1949 Geneva Conventions.2  
The goal of the law of war is to mitigate the accompanying evils of war by:  “(a) 
Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (b) 
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of 
the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and (c) 
Facilitating the restoration of peace.”3   
 
                                                
1 U.S.  DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956). 
2 The Geneva Conventions are set out in four categories: (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; (3) Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III]; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
3 U.S.  DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 2 (1956). 
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     In tandem with the strict mandates associated with the law of war, some countries, 
to include the United States, self-impose so-called Rules of Engagement (ROE) as 
restrictive additions to the law of war in order to further limit the lawful application 
of the use of force in combat.  Enclosure 1 is a recently issued ROE issued by 
General John R. Allen, the Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF).  Although labeled as a “Tactical Directive,” it is an ROE in that it 
“provides guidance and intent for the employment of force in support of ISAF 
operations”4 by limiting when, how, and where violence may be utilized in combat 
situations.  ROE are considered “lawful orders.”  Hence, a violation of an ROE can 
be a criminal offense under the military’s Uniform Code of Military Justice.      
 
III.  Administrative Punishment for Violating ROE 
     Since the start of the “War on Terror”5 in 2001, the United States has engaged in 
two major military actions – Iraq6 and Afghanistan.7  In both conflicts the United 
States promulgated numerous ROE to further limit the use of force.  These ROE were 
changed many times over the years as dictated by political considerations.  Indeed, as 
the conflict in Afghanistan continues, ROE are still subject to revision.   
 
     Unlike the law of war, which is static in nature until revised by international 
treaty, ROE can be changed at any time based on political or policy objectives.  
While the rule of law provisions related to the law of war reflect fundamental 
concepts of human behavior that comport with universal moral values recognized 
across cultural lines – don’t kill civilians, don’t kill enemies that surrender, don’t 
destroy civilian property, etc. – ROE address restrictions on behavior that are not 
intrinsic in nature.  In many instances, the prohibited behavior set out in an ROE is 
extremely subtle and produces random outcomes.  Micromanaging the otherwise 
lawful use of force under the law of war, as ROE require, can result in confusion on 
the one hand, and inaction on the other.  Service members are often unsure what the 
ROE requires and may simply choose to do nothing for fear of violating the ROE.    
                                                
4 COMISAF Tactical Directive, 30 Nov. 2011, HQ, ISAF. 
5 The term War on Terror is used both as a metaphor to describe a general conflict against international terrorist groups 
and, more precisely, to describe the ongoing international armed conflict between the United States of America and the 
“Taliban, al-Qa’eda, or associated forces.”  See Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 
Stat. 2600, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).    
6 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1498-
99 (2002) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).  The Authorization cited many factors to justify the use of military force 
against Iraq, including that alleged weapons of mass destruction and programs to develop such weapons posed a “threat 
to the national security of the United States,” id. at 1498, and Iraq’s “capability and willingness to use weapons of mass 
destruction against other nations and its own people,” id. at 1499. 
7 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1541). 
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          As a consequence of the proliferation of ROE during the War on Terror, many 
soldiers have been wrongfully accused of violating applicable provisions.  In some 
instances, the soldiers were unaware of the violation, but in others it is evident that 
the highest levels of the chain of command itself are unclear about the application and 
function of a given ROE.  Furthermore, in some instances similar violations of ROE 
are not punished equally.  Not only are some service members disciplined by criminal 
action while others are disciplined by administrative action, in many cases service 
members receive absolutely no punishment whatsoever for violations of ROE.  
Enclosure 2 provides a stunning example of how the Staff Judge Advocate for US 
Marine Corps Forces Central Command deemed the violation of an ROE in 
Afghanistan on October 28, 2011, by Marine Lt. Col. Seth Folsom, as excusable and 
not worthy of “disciplinary action” because Lt. Col. Folsom’s use of “non-precision 
munitions” into a civilian area “did not result in any civilian casualties.”  Ironically, 
Lt. Col. Seth Folsom unjustly punished a subordinate under his command, 1stLt 
Joshua C. Waddell, for use of precision weapons on November 1, 2011, when 
Waddell ordered snipers to disable a tractor that was carrying a wounded enemy 
combatant.  Similar to Lt. Col. Folsom’s use of force three days prior, no civilians 
were harmed.       
 
     For those who violate the ROE the military command would generally charge the 
service member with a crime (disobeying a lawful order).  In some instances, 
however, the military does not charge the service member with a crime but uses 
adverse administrative measures to punish.  While a service member has numerous 
due process rights when charged with a crime, due process rights associated with 
adverse administrative actions are far more limited in nature.  Hence the need for 
some level of additional impartial review. 
 
     The case of Marine 1stLt Joshua C. Waddell (encl. 3 – Addicott letter to Board of 
Corrections for Naval Records) mentioned herein illustrates the problem.  The 
military chain of command wrongfully relied on an alleged violation of an ROE to 
employ severe administrative punishments tantamount to terminating the officer’s 
opportunity for promotion in the military.  While 1stLt Waddell was never charged 
with a crime, he was relieved from his position as Executive Officer and given a 
fitness report (FITREP) that recommend no promotion (encl. 4).  If 1stLt Waddell 
had been charged with a crime, he would have had access to a full range of due 
process rights.  Since his commander elected administrative action only, 1stLt 
Waddell’s only functional recourse outside of his chain of command was to appeal 
the FITREP to an administrative board in the United States (Board of Corrections for 
Naval Records) – a process limited in due process and extensive in costs and time.   
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IV.  Proposing Legislation 
     While the role of Congress is not to conduct war, Congress does have the power 
under Section 8 of the Constitution to “make Rules for the … Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces.”  In order to provide a neutral level of review outside of the chain 
of command for service members who are facing adverse administrative actions such 
as relief or adverse fitness reports, an independent ROE Review Board should be 
established in theater to conduct an impartial review prior to said adverse actions 
being finalized against the service member.  The board should be composed of senior 
military officers as selected and appointed by the applicable Combatant Commander.  
The board should be placed in the theater of combat operations in order to facilitate 
the gathering of evidence as expeditiously as possible, to include witness statements, 
Preliminary Investigation reports, Command Investigation reports, etc.  The service 
member should have the right to appear before the board.  The board should be 
required to make specific findings and recommendations.  Said findings and 
recommendations would go to the appointing authority who would make a final 
determination.  The details of the review process should be drawn from the due 
process provisions in accordance with those procedures found in Army Regulation 
15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 
 
     The ROE Review Board is not designed to supersede any of the provisions 
already available for service members to include recourse within the chain of 
command.  It functions as an extra level of protection outside the chain of command. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION:  
An ROE Review Board be created in order to provide an impartial review process 
for service members accused of violations of ROE but facing adverse administrative 
action only.  The ROE Review Board would: 
• Consist of at least three senior military officers.  
• Be appointed by the subject Combatant Commander. 
• Convene in the theater of combat operations on a permanent basis. 
• Apply the due process provisions promulgated by the DOD.  
• Consider all requests dealing with alleged violations of ROE or Tactical 
Directives and determine eligibility of the case.  
• Conduct a thorough, comprehensive, and properly documented investigation.   
• Make specific findings and recommendations to the Combatant Commander. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 
     Due to the confusing and changing nature of ROE and how they are applied, it is 
painfully apparent that ROE have proven to be a source of injustice to service 
members in the field of combat operations.  This is particularly true when the chain of 
command uses administrative punishment as a form of discipline, providing little 
recourse to the service member.   
 
     Since nothing is absolutely certain in the realm of combat, it is clear that service 
members need an extra level of due process protection when it comes to the issue of 
alleged ROE violations.   In fact, the creation of an autonomous ROE Review Board 
which functions outside of the chain of command may prove useful in revealing  
ROE that should be repealed.  In addition, an autonomous ROE Review Board 
would go far in eliminating perceptions of double standards.  
 
     The recommendations put forth in this paper are meant as a starting point in how 
best to provide this level of review.  At a minimum an ROE Review Board will 
better clarify what exactly is expected of our troops in the field, thereby alleviating 
fears of unjust treatment from the chain of command when adverse administrative 
measures are proposed against a service member. 
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